The State of Local Sports Rights in 2026

Disclosure: The author is Chief Strategy Officer of Victory+, one of the streaming platforms named in this report. Wherever Victory+ deals are discussed, the cited reporting comes from third-party sources (Sports Business Journal, Sportico, Sports Media Watch, Wikipedia, etc.), not internal company materials.

Executive Summary

The regional sports network (RSN) — for thirty years the load-bearing layer of professional sports economics in the United States — is in the final stage of an unwind that began in 2022 and accelerates to its endpoint in April 2026. Main Street Sports Group, the corporate successor to Diamond Sports Group and operator of the FanDuel Sports Network RSN portfolio, announced on April 3, 2026 that it would wind down operations at the conclusion of the 2025-26 NBA regular season (April 12) and the first round of the NHL playoffs (late April). SBJ’s Tom Friend reported on January 30, 2026 that Main Street faced “the real possibility of liquidation” and could file Chapter 7 imminently — a fate it ultimately deferred only because the departure of nine MLB teams in early 2026 freed enough cash to fund operations through April.

The result, by market: 29 of the 30 MLB clubs, 13 NBA franchises, and 6-7 NHL franchises have either already moved off the legacy RSN model or will be forced to before the 2026-27 season tips off. Four replacement models are competing for the rights freed by the collapse:

1. League-direct production and distribution — MLB Local Media now produces local telecasts for 14 of MLB’s 30 clubs, with ESPN holding in-market streaming rights under a new three-year deal. The NBA is in active negotiations with YouTube TV, Amazon, ESPN, Google, Apple, and DAZN for a centralized local streaming hub that could include up to 22 of 30 teams.
2. Free over-the-air broadcast partnerships — Scripps Sports (E.W. Scripps Company), Gray Television, and TEGNA have built portfolios across NBA and NHL teams, converting independent broadcast stations into team-specific homes.
3. Team-owned RSNs with direct-to-consumer streaming — A growing roster of franchises (YES, NESN, SNY, Marquee, MASN, BravesVision, Rangers Sports Network, Detroit SportsNet, Space City Home Network, Chicago Sports Network) have moved to owned-and-operated models with paid DTC apps.
4. Free ad-supported streaming — Victory+ (operated by Calgary’s A Parent Media Co.) has assembled a multi-league portfolio of free-to-fan local rights deals across the NHL, MLB, and WNBA.

The NHL is leaving the response to individual franchises; the NBA is engineering a centralized package; MLB has already executed its centralization. No single replacement model has won. The market is fragmenting into a hybrid stack — typically some combination of free OTA broadcast plus a DTC streaming app, league-direct production plus team-branded distribution, or free streaming with linear simulcast.

The financial implication is structural. Cable-bundle subscriber fees, which carried the RSN business model from inception, are gone or going. Replacement models monetize differently — ad-supported broadcast, subscription DTC, league-collective bargaining, first-party data — and at lower per-fan revenue. The question for 2026-2027 is not whether the RSN era ends. It already has. The question is which replacement model captures which markets, on what terms, and at what valuation when local rights cycles next reprice.

Two structural points cut against the “everything is worse than the cable bundle” reading. First, an OTA + FAST hybrid reaches a strictly larger addressable market than an RSN ever did: the 16.3% antenna-only cohort plus the cable, satellite, and vMVPD bundle cohort that an RSN previously reached on its own (see §3.2). Second, the post-RSN era is unfolding into an advertising market — connected-TV — that is growing 14% per year while linear cable contracts 7% per year (see §10). The Victory+ portfolio’s disclosed performance over its first two seasons — 8-10x viewership of the prior RSN for the Dallas Stars in year one, 127% YoY growth for the Anaheim Ducks in year two, a record 342,000+ concurrent viewers in a single Stars-Avalanche regional broadcast (see §3.4 and §7.2) — is the cleanest available evidence that the audience side of the trade is real. The cash side of the trade is harder, slower, and team-specific, but the directional argument for the post-RSN stack is no longer hypothetical.

1. The Corporate Endgame: Diamond → Bally → FanDuel → Wind-Down

The entity now winding down was founded May 3, 2019 as Diamond Sports Group, a joint venture between Sinclair Broadcast Group and Byron Allen’s Allen Media Group, formed to acquire 22 regional sports networks Disney was required to divest as part of its acquisition of 21st Century Fox. The purchase price was $9.6 billion, closing in August 2019. At peak, the portfolio carried local rights for 14 MLB franchises, 16 NBA franchises, and 12 NHL franchises — a footprint that touched the local-rights economics of 29 of the 88 teams across the three major North American leagues.

Key chronology

Sources: Wikipedia; SBJ (via Sports Media Watch summary and Awful Announcing); ESPN; Sportico.

The failed DAZN deal

For three months from November 2025 to January 2026, the United Kingdom-based streamer DAZN was in advanced talks to acquire a majority stake in Main Street. Per Front Office Sports, DAZN’s revised proposal contained three demands that proved fatal: (1) reduced local rights fees to teams, (2) additional digital content rights, and (3) extended contract terms. MLB clubs found this combination “unpalatable.” Friend’s SBJ reporting noted that DAZN appeared to be weighing whether to wait for Main Street to collapse and then pursue local team rights directly — “a far more attractive option than a rescue deal.” That calculation appears to have prevailed; DAZN is now among the bidders for the NBA’s centralized streaming hub rather than the buyer of the RSN portfolio.

The trigger for the January acceleration was a missed rights-fee payment to the St. Louis Cardinals in December 2025. By February 2, all nine remaining MLB teams had terminated, leaving Main Street with only its NBA and NHL portfolios — sufficient revenue, per Friend, to fund operations through the April season-end but not to continue beyond.

Manfred’s framing

Asked about the collapse in late January 2026, MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred told reporters: “No matter what happens, whether it’s Main Street, a third party, or MLB Media, fans are going to have the games… Our focus is to maximize the revenue that’s available to the clubs. The clubs have control over the timing.” That is, on its face, a confidence statement. Operationally, it is a reframing — from “the league depends on the RSN” to “the league absorbs the function the RSN used to perform.”

2. Why the RSN Model Collapsed

The proximate cause of Diamond/Main Street’s bankruptcy was a leveraged-buyout balance sheet that could not survive a cable-bundle decline faster than its debt service. But the proximate cause obscures the structural one: the RSN business model was a category that depended on the cable bundle as a delivery system, and the cable bundle is in public, accelerating collapse.

The RSN model worked because every cable subscriber in a team’s home market paid the RSN a per-subscriber fee — $5 to $8 per month — regardless of whether they watched a single game. Those subscriber fees, multiplied by millions of households, funded local rights deals that no advertising-only model could match. The model assumed that the “marginal fan” — the household that subscribed to cable for non-sports reasons but happened to pay the RSN bundle fee anyway — would remain in the bundle indefinitely.

When cord-cutting accelerated past a critical threshold (roughly 2018-2020), the marginal fan left. Diamond’s revenues collapsed not because hardcore fans stopped watching but because the much larger non-fan-paying-anyway cohort exited the bundle. The category that had been propping up the entire pricing structure dissolved. Per Sportico’s reporting on the wind-down, the 29 franchises whose local rights were tied to Main Street represent the largest single concentrated repricing event in the history of US sports media.

The 2022 unwind of AT&T SportsNet (Warner Bros. Discovery’s RSN portfolio) was the canary. WBD announced its intent to exit the regional sports market in February 2023. Its three remaining RSNs — Rocky Mountain, Pittsburgh, and Root Sports Northwest — followed distinct paths:

• AT&T SportsNet Rocky Mountain ceased operations on October 6, 2023. The Colorado Rockies, Utah Jazz, and Vegas Golden Knights all had to scramble for replacements.
• AT&T SportsNet Pittsburgh was divested to a joint venture between Fenway Sports Group and the Pittsburgh Pirates and rebranded as SportsNet Pittsburgh, continuing operations.
• AT&T SportsNet Southwest was acquired by the Houston Astros and Houston Rockets and rebranded as Space City Home Network.
• Root Sports Northwest, fully acquired by the Seattle Mariners in 2024, was shut down on December 31, 2025 after the Mariners chose to migrate to MLB Local Media + Mariners.TV for 2026.

The WBD episode telegraphed every variable of the Diamond/Main Street collapse two years in advance. By the time Main Street filed Chapter 11, no replacement model had yet won — and three years later, none has.

3. The Replacement Models

Five distinct models have emerged. They are not mutually exclusive. Most franchises are assembling stacks that combine two or three.

3.1 Model A — League-direct production and distribution

Definition: The league produces local telecasts in-house and distributes via a combination of streaming app, broadcast partner, and league-controlled cable carriage.

Example: MLB Local Media. Founded as a department within Major League Baseball to absorb teams exiting Diamond/Main Street. As of the 2026 season, MLB Local Media produces local broadcasts for 14 teams: Arizona, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Colorado, Detroit, Kansas City, Miami, Milwaukee, Minnesota, San Diego, Seattle, St. Louis, Tampa Bay, and Washington. Each team has its own team-branded DTC app (Dbacks.TV, Reds.TV, etc.) priced at $20/month or $100/season, with a bundled MLB.TV + local option at $199.99/season (a 20% savings on individual purchase).

ESPN holds in-market streaming rights for MLB-produced local broadcasts as part of a new three-year media-rights deal, giving ESPN Unlimited subscribers access to one regular-season game per day, subject to local blackouts. The bundle price is $134.99 per season for ESPN Unlimited subscribers adding MLB.TV.

The economic structure is collectively bargained: teams cede direct rights negotiations to the league in exchange for a national distribution apparatus and a share of pooled revenue. It is the closest American baseball has come to the NFL’s centralized rights model.

3.2 Model B — Free over-the-air broadcast partnership

Definition: The team licenses local rights to an independent broadcast station (typically owned by Scripps, Gray, TEGNA, Nexstar, Weigel, or a smaller broadcaster), which produces and airs games for free over-the-air, sometimes paired with the broadcaster’s streaming product.

Example: Detroit Pistons → Scripps Sports. Announced May 13, 2026, a multi-year agreement makes WMYD TV20 Detroit the official local broadcast home of the Pistons starting 2026-27 — the first time Pistons games have aired on free OTA television since 2005. Games will air across the Detroit DMA and state of Michigan. Terms were not disclosed.

Example: Nashville Predators → Scripps Sports. Announced April 7, 2026, a multi-year agreement covering all local preseason, regular-season, and first-round playoff games beginning 2026-27. Scripps will convert WNPX Channel 28 into an independent station branded “The Spot” to carry the games. The deal also includes 30-minute pre- and post-game shows for every locally broadcast game.

Scripps Sports’ total NHL portfolio now spans four teams as of 2025-26: Tampa Bay Lightning, Florida Panthers, Vegas Golden Knights (third year of partnership in 2025-26, 69 games on The Spot — Vegas 34), and Utah Mammoth (formerly Arizona Coyotes) — plus the Predators starting 2026-27.

Gray Television has built a complementary portfolio across the NBA: it acquired games from the Phoenix Suns (July 2023) and the New Orleans Pelicans (August 2024), and carries 10-game packages for the Atlanta Hawks and 5-game packages for the Cleveland Cavaliers. Weigel Broadcasting carries a 10-game Milwaukee Bucks package. Griffin Media carries an 8-game Oklahoma City Thunder package.

TEGNA’s most prominent deal is with the Dallas Mavericks (see Model D below).

The reach math: free antenna versus paid bundle. The strategic advantage of an OTA-based stack is that the broadcast signal reaches two distinct cohorts that an RSN never could simultaneously: (a) cord-cutters watching free via an antenna, and (b) bundle subscribers watching the same broadcast channel via cable / satellite / vMVPD retransmission, where it sits as a paid channel inside their monthly bill. The Nielsen National Media-Related Universe Estimates (July 2025, distributed by TVB) put US TV-household distribution at:

The implication: a sports rights package carried on a free OTA broadcast station (and made available to retransmission consent on cable, satellite, and vMVPD) reaches roughly 49% of US TV households via cable + DBS + antenna alone, and ~65% once vMVPD retrans is added — and the 16.3% antenna-only cohort is reached for free. A traditional RSN, by definition a cable-bundle channel, reached only the pay-TV side: in the bundle’s 2011 peak, that was over 80% of US TV households; by year-end 2024, per S&P Global Market Intelligence, pay-TV penetration had fallen to 34.4%, and basic cable networks had shed subscribers for nine consecutive years (averaging 7.1% annual declines in 2024).

The cord-cutter cohort is not negligible and not getting smaller. Pew Research (April 2025 survey, n=9,397) reports 36% of US adults still subscribe to cable or satellite at home, but 83% use streaming services; antenna ownership independently sits at 19% of US homes per Horowitz Research, up 3 percentage points YoY. For a team that needs to reach the broadest possible local audience, an OTA + FAST hybrid is the only path that captures both the antenna-only cord-cutter and the cable-still-subscribing household in a single distribution.

3.3 Model C — Team-owned RSN with DTC streaming

Definition: The franchise (sometimes jointly with another local team) owns and operates a regional sports network, typically launched as an alternative to Diamond/Main Street or as the successor to a defunct RSN.

Sources: SMW MLB local broadcasts FAQ, Wikipedia Rangers Sports Network, Wikipedia Texas Rangers, Wikipedia Root Sports NW.

The economics here are owner-favorable when team valuations rise (franchise + RSN value as a stack), but cable-distribution headwinds apply uniformly. Several team-owned RSNs have moved aggressively into DTC: NESN 360, MASN+, Marquee streaming, SNP 360, Detroit SportsNet streaming.

3.4 Model D — Free ad-supported streaming (FAST) with linear simulcast

Definition: The franchise licenses local rights to a free, ad-supported streaming platform — sometimes with concurrent linear over-the-air broadcast on a partner station.

Example: Dallas Mavericks “playbook.” Per Dallas Hoops Journal’s analysis, the Mavericks paired with TEGNA’s KFAA in Dallas-Fort Worth (simulcast on WFAA) for at least 70 OTA games per season, with carriage extended across Waco, Tyler, Midland-Odessa, Abilene, and San Angelo. Their DTC product, MavsTV, is delivered via TV.Mavs.com plus apps on Apple TV, Android TV, Fire TV, Roku, and select smart TVs, with territory-gating across Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. The Mavericks’ reach roughly tripled in households versus the previous Bally Sports Southwest distribution — to ~10 million households across more than 3.1 million Texas homes.

The Mavericks model is widely characterized as the playbook the rest of the NBA is “scrambling to replicate,” per Dallas Hoops Journal.

The financial logic is a category trade: local rights in a sub-RSN era are not a meaningful cash line for most franchises, so swapping them for distribution upstream of monetization is a net positive in many markets.

3.5 Model E — OTT streaming

Definition: The franchise licenses local rights to a streaming platform — who then produces all the games and manages all distribution including sublicensing content to out-of-home partners, linear OTA partners and others.

Example: Victory+. Operated by A Parent Media Co. of Calgary, Victory+ launched September 11, 2024 as an OTT sports streaming service. Some of its team partnerships, by date:

Sources: Victory+ Wikipedia, Texas Rangers Wikipedia, Rangers Sports Network Wikipedia, Dallas Cowboys Sports Video Group, Atlanta Dream announcement, Business Wire Lynx.

The financial logic bets on a structural shift: audiences and ad dollars are shifting to streaming as most homes now consume television content on a connected TV. Rights fees are typically higher than what is being offered by OTA stations as monetization potential is much higher, along with a broader audience, first-party data, and an in-app commerce surface.

Audience anchor. Two years in, Victory+ has published audience multiples that materially exceed what the same teams produced behind the cable/DTC paywall. Per APMC’s May 18, 2026 release, Dallas Stars viewership on Victory+ in the 2024-25 inaugural year ran at 8-10x the previous RSN, with a further 43% YoY increase in 2025-26 regular-season viewership and a 52% playoff lift; the Anaheim Ducks ran 3-5x prior RSN in their 2024-25 debut, then grew an additional 127% YoY in 2025-26 with a 59% playoff spike. The same release reports a March 6, 2026 record audience of 342,000+ concurrent viewers for Stars-Avalanche in a regional market representing roughly 10% of the US population, and a 122% YoY surge in 2025-26 Stars viewership overall. Independent third-party validation: Sportico’s April 24, 2026 ratings roundup, citing Nielsen Station Index data, reports league-wide in-market NHL deliveries grew 15% in 2025-26 — powered by a 51% gain in unique streamers per game — and names the Ducks as the No. 2 local-ratings gainer in the league, crediting the OTA + Victory+ stack directly. (Disclosure: the author of this report is CSO of Victory+. Internal V+ data suggest additional engagement and unique-household multiples beyond the publicly-disclosed audience figures cited above; only the disclosed figures appear in this paper.)

4. By Market — Major League Baseball

All 30 MLB teams’ local broadcast/streaming situations for the 2026 season, sourced from Sports Media Watch’s March 2026 FAQ, Wikipedia, and MLB’s official guide.

4.1 American League East

4.2 American League Central

4.3 American League West

4.4 National League East

4.5 National League Central

4.6 National League West

Summary — MLB structural reality, 2026

14 teams on MLB Local Media (league-direct): Arizona, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Colorado, Detroit (team-owned brand, MLB-produced), Kansas City, Miami, Milwaukee, Minnesota, San Diego, Seattle, St. Louis, Tampa Bay, Washington.

11 teams on team-owned/joint-venture RSNs: Yankees (YES), Red Sox (NESN), Astros (SCHN), Cubs (Marquee), Tigers (DSN), Pirates (SNP), Angels (FSNW), Braves (BravesVision), Orioles (MASN), Dodgers (SNLA), White Sox (CHSN).

4 teams on independent or Comcast-controlled RSNs: Mets (SNY), Phillies (NBC Sports Philadelphia), Athletics (NBC Sports California), Giants (NBC Sports Bay Area).

1 hybrid DTC-only deal: Texas Rangers (Rangers Sports Network on Victory+).

1 home-country broadcaster: Toronto Blue Jays (Sportsnet Canada).

All 30 MLB teams now offer some form of in-market DTC streaming — the structural shift complete two years after the first MLB team (Diamondbacks) left Diamond. Across the 30 clubs, 15 retain an RSN partnership of some form (team-owned, joint-venture, or independent).

5. By Market — National Basketball Association

The NBA’s RSN unwind lags MLB’s by approximately 24 months. Thirteen NBA franchises remain on FanDuel Sports Network through the end of the 2025-26 regular season (April 12, 2026), at which point Main Street’s NBA operations cease entirely. The league has formally notified these clubs that they are free to pursue new in-market media rights deals ahead of the 2026-27 season, per Sports Business Journal.

5.1 Teams currently on FanDuel Sports Network (13)

Per Sports Media Watch’s February 2026 reporting and thedesk.net:

Atlanta Hawks, Charlotte Hornets, Cleveland Cavaliers, Detroit Pistons, Indiana Pacers, Los Angeles Clippers, Memphis Grizzlies, Miami Heat, Milwaukee Bucks, Minnesota Timberwolves, Oklahoma City Thunder, Orlando Magic, San Antonio Spurs.

Confirmed 2026-27 deals to date:

• Detroit Pistons → Scripps Sports / WMYD TV20 (announced May 13, 2026; multi-year; OTA across state of Michigan).
• Miami Heat → WPLG Local 10 (free OTA; announced June 8, 2026).

The other eleven clubs are in active negotiation as of the date of this report.

5.2 Teams on NBC Sports Regional Networks (4)

Per the NBC Sports Regional Networks Wikipedia entry and Peacock’s 2024 in-market integration, four NBC Sports-owned RSNs operate as of 2026: NBC Sports Bay Area, NBC Sports Boston, NBC Sports California, and NBC Sports Philadelphia. NBA teams carried:

• Boston Celtics — NBC Sports Boston
• Golden State Warriors — NBC Sports Bay Area
• Philadelphia 76ers — NBC Sports Philadelphia
• Sacramento Kings — NBC Sports California

NBC Sports Regional Networks (formerly Comcast SportsNet) face their own cable-bundle pressures but are not part of the Main Street wind-down. In-market streaming is available via Peacock as of 2024.

5.3 Teams on team-owned RSNs (7)

• New York Knicks — MSG Network (Madison Square Garden Sports Corp / Dolan family)
• Brooklyn Nets — YES Network (Gotham Sports App)
• Los Angeles Lakers — Spectrum SportsNet (Charter-operated; faces potential sale or bankruptcy per SMW)
• Chicago Bulls — Chicago Sports Network (JV with White Sox, Blackhawks, Standard Media)
• Houston Rockets — Space City Home Network (JV with Astros)
• Denver Nuggets — Altitude Sports and Entertainment, owned by Kroenke Sports & Entertainment; also carries the NHL’s Colorado Avalanche, NLL’s Colorado Mammoth, and MLS’s Colorado Rapids. Altitude+ DTC service offered separately.
• Washington Wizards — Monumental Sports Network (formerly NBC Sports Washington until the 2023 acquisition by Monumental Sports & Entertainment, Ted Leonsis-controlled; also carries the Capitals and Mystics)

5.4 Teams already on free OTA + DTC (7)

• Dallas Mavericks — TEGNA KFAA-TV + MavsTV (the playbook)
• New Orleans Pelicans — Gray Television
• Phoenix Suns — Gray Television (left Diamond July 2023, first NBA exit)
• Utah Jazz — KJZZ-TV Channel 14 (free OTA) + Jazz+ DTC at $20/month or $126/year; a Jazz+/Mammoth+ bundle is offered at $175/year via SEG Media (Smith Entertainment Group). Jazz+ streaming is operated by Kiswe, separate from the Sinclair-tied KJZZ-TV carriage agreement.
• Portland Trail Blazers — Rip City TV Network, launched for 2025-26 via partnership with Sinclair Broadcast Group on KUNP (former Portland Univision affiliate, now independent). 74 Blazers games on KUNP for 2025-26, with seven simulcast on ABC affiliate KATU. The team ended its ROOT Sports contract a year early to launch.
• Detroit Pistons — Scripps Sports / WMYD TV20 (announced May 13, 2026; multi-year; OTA across state of Michigan).
• Miami Heat — WPLG Local 10 (free OTA; announced June 8, 2026).

5.5 The NBA’s centralized streaming hub (in development)

The league has accelerated plans for a centralized streaming package that would aggregate local broadcasts from up to 22 of 30 franchises on a single service, starting as soon as 2026-27. The 13 Main Street teams plus the 4-5 NBC Sports Regional Network teams plus the 5 already-streaming teams (Suns, Jazz, Trail Blazers, Mavericks, Pelicans) make up the prospective pool.

Bidders confirmed in talks as of SBJ’s May 1, 2026 reporting and SMW:

DAZN has reportedly offered one-year interim bridge deals to the 13 Main Street teams in case the centralized hub launch is delayed past the 2026-27 tipoff. Industry sources estimate the centralized package could be worth “billions of dollars” annually.

The model preserves team-level rights control while consolidating consumer-facing distribution — a hybrid of Models A and C above, with the league as aggregator rather than producer.

6. By Market — National Hockey League

The NHL’s situation differs from the NBA’s in three respects: (1) the affected portfolio is smaller (6-7 teams remaining on FanDuel), (2) the league has elected a pragmatic non-strategy, leaving each team to negotiate its own arrangement, and (3) a parallel non-Diamond/Main Street unwind has been running in markets where AT&T SportsNet collapsed years earlier (Pittsburgh, Denver, Salt Lake City).

6.1 Teams currently on FanDuel Sports Network (7)

Per The Hockey News and Cord Cutters News:

Carolina Hurricanes, Columbus Blue Jackets, Detroit Red Wings, Los Angeles Kings, Minnesota Wild, Nashville Predators, St. Louis Blues.

Confirmed 2026-27 deals to date:

• Nashville Predators → Scripps Sports / WNPX “The Spot” (announced April 7, 2026; multi-year; OTA + 30-minute pre/post-game shows).
• Detroit Red Wings → Detroit SportsNet (the year-round team-owned RSN unveiled in March 2026 as the joint Tigers/Red Wings home; Ilitch Sports + Entertainment ownership). Red Wings games stayed on FanDuel Sports Network Detroit through the final 2025-26 broadcast on April 15, 2026.
• Minnesota Wild — final FanDuel season was 2025-26; no announced 2026-27 distribution as of the date of this report. A Wild job posting for digital/streaming roles has fueled speculation about a Victory+ partnership, though nothing is confirmed. Industry expectation is a team-owned DTC similar to Twins.TV (per StarTribune reporting).

The remaining four teams — Carolina Hurricanes, Columbus Blue Jackets, Los Angeles Kings, and St. Louis Blues — are in active negotiation as of the date of this report.

6.2 Scripps Sports’ NHL portfolio (4 teams + Predators starting 2026-27)

• Tampa Bay Lightning — WXPX-TV (formerly Ion station); deal announced May 2025
• Florida Panthers — Scripps Sports (deal active since 2024; was part of original Diamond exit cohort)
• Vegas Golden Knights — Scripps Sports since 2023-24 (third year of partnership in 2025-26); 69 of 82 regular-season games air on The Spot — Vegas 34 (KMCC) over-the-air plus VGK’s KnightTime+ DTC streaming
• Utah Mammoth (relocated from Arizona Coyotes) — KUPX-TV “Utah 16” (Scripps-affiliated) + SEG+ / Mammoth+ DTC ($69.99/year or $14.99/month)
• Nashville Predators — WNPX “The Spot” (starting 2026-27)

Scripps’ deal structure across these teams is consistent: free OTA broadcast via a Scripps-owned independent station (typically a converted Ion affiliate), produced by Scripps Sports, with team-controlled DTC as a separate revenue stream. The Forbes characterization that “Scripps Sports now has agreements with four NHL teams” — soon five — makes Scripps the single largest non-Main-Street NHL local broadcaster.

6.3 Victory+ NHL portfolio (3 teams)

• Dallas Stars — 7-year deal from July 7, 2024; free streaming for all non-national games
• Anaheim Ducks — 2-year deal from August 2024; free + KCOP-TV / KTTV LA simulcast
• St. Louis Blues (partial) — limited preseason and 3 regular-season games annually

6.4 Other NHL distribution (11 US RSN teams + 1 OTA + 7 Canadian teams)

• MSG Network — Rangers, Islanders, Devils, Sabres (Dolan-owned)
• NBC Sports Regional Networks — Bruins on NBC Sports Boston; Flyers on NBC Sports Philadelphia; Sharks on NBC Sports California. (The four NBC RSNs are limited to Bay Area, Boston, California, and Philadelphia per the network’s portfolio; no other NHL teams.)
• Monumental Sports Network — Washington Capitals (alongside Wizards and Mystics), Ted Leonsis-controlled
• Altitude Sports — Colorado Avalanche (alongside Nuggets), Kroenke-owned
• Chicago Sports Network — Blackhawks
• AT&T SportsNet Pittsburgh legacy → SportsNet Pittsburgh — Penguins
• TEGNA (free OTA) — Seattle Kraken
• Sportsnet (Canadian) — All 7 Canadian teams plus US broadcasts

6.5 The league’s strategic position

Per TVREV’s reporting, NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman has indicated a preference for “a mixed model for local rights,” allowing teams to negotiate their own arrangements across RSNs, streaming platforms, and broadcast stations. The NHL is not centralizing in the MLB Local Media sense nor coordinating a hub in the NBA sense; the league is letting each market settle into its own equilibrium. This reflects the NHL’s smaller scale, the fragmented current state (Canadian teams on Sportsnet, US teams across many distribution partners), and a pragmatic recognition that what works in Nashville (free OTA via Scripps) is different from what works in Dallas (free streaming via Victory+) is different from what works in Detroit (team-owned RSN via Ilitch).

7. The Operators

Five entities are emerging as the primary post-RSN local-rights operators, each with a distinct model.

7.1 Scripps Sports (E.W. Scripps Company, NASDAQ: SSP)

Model: Free OTA broadcast via Scripps-owned independent stations (typically converted Ion or Bounce affiliates), with Scripps Sports producing telecasts.

Portfolio (2026): NHL — Tampa Bay Lightning, Florida Panthers, Vegas Golden Knights, Utah Mammoth, Nashville Predators (starting 2026-27). NBA — Detroit Pistons (starting 2026-27, first NBA team). WNBA — N/A.

Strategic logic: Scripps has been re-purposing low-rated Ion affiliates into team-branded independent stations, monetizing through national + local ad sales and securing must-carry status with cable/satellite. The business case combines: (a) recovering audience for declining Ion stations, (b) selling Scripps’s broadcast advertising sales force into a higher-CPM sports inventory, and (c) brand-building Scripps Sports as a national operator of regional rights.

7.2 Victory+ (A Parent Media Co., Calgary)

Model: Free ad-supported streaming television (FAST) with optional linear simulcast through team-selected broadcast partners.

Portfolio (2026): NHL — Dallas Stars (7-year), Anaheim Ducks (2-year), St. Louis Blues (partial). MLB — Texas Rangers (multi-year, paid DTC at $100-150/season — paywall imposed by MLB local-rights restrictions, not the platform model). WNBA — Minnesota Lynx (multi-year, free), Atlanta Dream (multi-year, free, with Gray Media simulcast).

Strategic logic: Victory+ trades cash rights fees for distribution upside — broader in-market audience, first-party data, integrated commerce surface. The model is particularly attractive for franchises whose previous local rights produced minimal cash (most non-MLB) or whose audience-growth need exceeds their need for immediate rights revenue (WNBA, Atlanta Dream). Launch was September 11, 2024.

Disclosed audience metrics (Stars + Ducks). Per APMC’s May 18, 2026 release, 2025-26 season totals:

Independent confirmation: Sportico (April 24, 2026) names the Ducks the No. 2 NHL local-ratings gainer (Chicago Blackhawks No. 1) and characterizes the Ducks’ OTA + Victory+ stack directly: “the Ducks appear to have navigated the post-RSN landscape without losing ground among their home fan base.” Nielsen Station Index data in the same piece reports the underlying league baseline (NHL +15% in-market deliveries) and the streaming dominance of the gains (+51% unique streamers per game).

Dallas Stars business outcomes (2024-26 case study). The audience lift has been accompanied by measurable business outcomes across the franchise. Public data points:

• Ticketing. As of February 2025, the Stars had sold out 93 consecutive playoff and regular-season home games, with a “lengthy waitlist” for the Victory Club season-ticket membership. Per the same SBJ reporting, the Stars raised 2025-26 season-ticket prices “anywhere between a 5% and 20%” depending on section, while remaining below the NHL average ticket price; renewal increases for 2026-27 tracked similar 15-20% bands per fan-forum disclosure of renewal letters. American Airlines Center averaged 18,532 per game in 2024-25 — 100% of capacity.
• Franchise value. Per CNBC’s November 25, 2025 NHL valuations, the Stars are valued at $2.05 billion (No. 14 of 32 NHL franchises), on $252 million revenue and $74 million EBITDA. Owner Tom Gaglardi acquired the team for $240 million in 2011; the valuation is now ~8.5x his purchase price. Sportico’s October 2025 NHL valuations put the NHL league-average team value at $2.1 billion.
• OTA distribution expansion. In April 2025, the Stars and Victory+ added a free linear simulcast partnership with FOX 4 (KDFW) and More 27 (KDFI) — the Fox Television Stations O&O properties in DFW — extending the team’s broadcast reach inside the DMA beyond the digital-only Victory+ footprint.
• Strategic framing from team leadership. Stars CEO Brad Alberts, per the March 2026 D CEO feature: “I don’t think they’re going to just come in with their magic wand, wave it over everybody, and sprinkle $25 million per team in rights for an entire league. The math doesn’t add up.” He also concedes the longer-tail uncertainty: “It’s too early to tell if the Stars’ bet on a free streaming network will prove economically viable to be a significant revenue driver for hockey operations.” The team’s calculation, per the July 2024 D Magazine interview where Alberts described the post-bankruptcy planning, was that broader distribution + first-party data + commerce upside outweighed the rights-fee-cash line in a market where the cable bundle was clearly degrading.
• Capital markets read. Alberts, in an April 10, 2026 Bloomberg interview: “Private equity interest and the rising popularity of live sports are poised to extend an advance in National Hockey League team valuations.” The structural reading is that even as the local-rights cash line compresses across the NHL, valuations continue to rise — and the Stars are an above-median data point in that distribution.

(Disclosure: the author is CSO of Victory+. All metrics, quotes, and outcomes in this section are sourced from third-party reporting or APMC public releases — internal company data has not been used. Where Victory+-specific operational metrics are not publicly disclosed, the report omits the figure rather than estimating.)

7.3 Gray Television

Model: OTA broadcast partnerships with team-selected games on Gray-owned stations, often layered with team-owned DTC.

Portfolio (2026): NBA — Phoenix Suns (left Diamond July 2023), New Orleans Pelicans (left Diamond August 2024), Atlanta Hawks (10-game package), Cleveland Cavaliers (5-game package). MLB — multiple OTA partnerships across MLB Local Media teams (Reds on Gray’s WXIX FOX19, Twins on Gray’s KMSP FOX 9). WNBA — Atlanta Dream (simulcast partner for Victory+ deal). (Note: the 10-game Milwaukee Bucks OTA package runs through Weigel Broadcasting, a separate operator, not Gray.)

Strategic logic: Gray Media is the third-largest US television station operator by station count, with 180 stations across 113 markets reaching ~37% of US television households. Following its May 2026 acquisition of Block Communications stations, the portfolio grew to over 200 stations. Gray monetizes those affiliates by adding live sports to typically lower-rated weeknight slots.

7.4 TEGNA

Model: OTA broadcast partnerships, typically a single flagship team per market.

Portfolio (2026): NBA — Dallas Mavericks (KFAA-TV / WFAA simulcast). WNBA — Dallas Wings on KFAA Channel 29 (deal announced February 13, 2025); 24 games on KFAA in 2026, with additional TEGNA, Gray Media, and Corridor Television partnerships extending the footprint to 12 Texas markets and 6.3 million households. MLB — Diamondbacks games on KPNX. (Note: Mets games on PIX11 are via Nexstar, not TEGNA.)

Strategic logic: Similar to Gray, but more concentrated. TEGNA’s bet is that a high-profile single team in a top-10 DMA produces enough advertising and political-ad spillover to justify the rights cost.

7.5 League-direct operators

• MLB Local Media — production-and-distribution organization within MLB, serving 14 teams as of 2026.
• NBA centralized streaming hub — in development; bidders include YouTube TV, Amazon, ESPN, DAZN, Google, Apple.
• NHL — no comparable structure; each team negotiates individually.

8. The Leagues’ Strategic Postures

Per TVREV, each league’s posture reflects its underlying economic structure. MLB’s smaller market spread + greater player-payroll pressure pushes toward central aggregation. The NBA’s higher per-team valuations + global brand strength supports a hub model that preserves team-level negotiating power. The NHL’s fragmented existing distribution + smaller scale supports individual-team flexibility. The WNBA, growing fastest from the smallest base, can experiment freely.

9. Financial Reality

9.1 What the RSN model paid

The asset class Diamond Sports Group purchased from Disney in 2019 was valued at $9.6 billion at closing — a price Sinclair and Allen Media could only justify by underwriting against high-confidence cable affiliate fees flowing across the 22-RSN portfolio. By February 2023, Diamond had missed a $140 million interest payment that triggered Chapter 11; total rights commitments Diamond was paying teams across MLB, NBA, and NHL at peak were the structural cause. During the 20-month bankruptcy proceeding that concluded in January 2025, Diamond renegotiated many of its rights-fee agreements with teams, lowering its costs — a stop-gap that bought time but did not solve the underlying cable-bundle erosion.

9.2 What replacement models pay (the gap)

The honest answer is most pay materially less.

• Free OTA via Scripps / Gray / TEGNA — primarily ad-supported. Rights fees in these deals are typically nominal or zero, with the team capturing in-game ad inventory directly or splitting it with the broadcast partner. Specific deal terms for Detroit Pistons-Scripps, Nashville Predators-Scripps, and the Mavericks-TEGNA arrangement were not disclosed publicly. The trajectory during Diamond’s bankruptcy is the best comparable: Diamond was able to renegotiate many rights-fee agreements downward during the 20-month proceeding, and team-level rights revenue under the replacement OTA structures is widely understood to be materially below pre-bankruptcy Bally levels — though exact replacement percentages remain undisclosed and likely vary substantially by market.
• Team-owned RSN with DTC — varies wildly by market. Top markets (Yankees, Dodgers, Red Sox) generate substantial revenue from carriage fees + DTC. Mid-tier markets struggle.
• League-direct (MLB Local Media) — collectively bargained pool; teams receive a share of pooled revenue rather than a direct rights fee. Sub-RSN per-team revenue, but with risk diversification across the pool and lower production overhead per team.
• Free streaming (Victory+, similar models) — minimal-to-zero direct rights fee; team value is distribution + data + audience growth.

The result: most franchises affected by the RSN unwind are accepting 30-60% reductions in local-rights revenue, partially offset by increases in national rights, sponsorship inventory, ticket revenue (from broader audience exposure), and DTC subscription revenue (where applicable). The franchises most exposed — mid-market NBA and NHL teams that depended on Diamond/Main Street as their primary local revenue line — are facing 2026-27 budgets meaningfully tighter than 2024-25.

9.3 The valuation question

Notwithstanding the local-rights repricing, franchise valuations across all four major North American leagues continue to rise. The WNBA’s first $1B team (Golden State Valkyries, May 2026) is the most visible recent data point. Per CNBC’s 2026 NBA franchise valuations, the average NBA team is now valued at $5.52 billion — 18% higher than one year prior, with three franchises (Warriors, Lakers, Knicks) crossing $10 billion for the first time. League-wide average revenue rose 6.7% YoY to $416 million per team. MLB and NHL valuations also continue to compound.

The interpretation: local-rights revenue, while structurally important historically, was never the variable that priced franchises at the margin. National rights, in-stadium revenue, sponsorship, real estate, and (for the NBA and MLB) global brand-building have become the price-setting factors. The local-rights collapse hurts the steady-state P&L; it does not appear to have repriced the asset class.

10. The Advertising Opportunity

The cable bundle’s economic motor for sports was a per-subscriber affiliate fee — a tax on every household in the market, whether they watched a game or not. That motor is dying. But a second motor is replacing it, and it is structurally better matched to how advertisers actually want to buy: the connected TV (CTV) and free ad-supported streaming TV (FAST) advertising market. For franchises that re-architect their local rights as OTA + FAST hybrids rather than paywalled RSN successors, this is not a consolation prize. It is, in several dimensions, a better business.

10.1 The market is bigger and growing faster than what it replaces

Per the IAB 2025 Digital Video Ad Spend & Strategy Report (released April 2025), digital video ad spend rose 18% in 2024 to $64 billion, projected to grow another 14% in 2025 to $72 billion — “two to three times faster than total media overall.” CTV specifically: $20.3B (2023) → $23.6B (2024, +16%) → $26.6B projected in 2025. By IAB’s count, digital video captured nearly 60% of all TV/video ad spend in 2025, double its share from five years prior, having surpassed linear TV for the first time in 2024. IAB’s January 2026 outlook projects CTV ad spend to grow another 13.8% in 2026, against a linear-TV decline of 14.4% in 2025.

IAB attributes the 2024 CTV rebound directly to sports. From the report: “A resurgence in live events and sports programming on streaming platforms, coupled with the expansion of self-serve and programmatic ad tools, helped CTV rebound with 16% year-over-year growth in 2024.” IAB CEO David Cohen, in the same release: “2024 was a pivotal year for digital video advertising. With high-quality content moving to streaming, advancements in advertising technology, and an influx of new inventory accelerated growth for both consumers and advertisers. CTV is making it clear it’s a go-to channel for both viewers and advertisers.”

A separate eMarketer projection puts US CTV ad spend at ~$38 billion in 2026, and at $45.96 billion by 2028. GroupM’s forecast puts the global CTV ad market at $32.6 billion by 2026.

10.2 The FAST cohort is now larger than any single broadcast network

The audience side has scaled to match. Per eMarketer’s April 2026 FAST FAQ:

• 131.4 million US FAST users in 2026 — 54% of all CTV users, +5.8% YoY.
• The Roku Channel reaches 97.3 million US viewers; Tubi 92.5 million; Pluto TV 68.6 million.
• Pluto + Tubi + Roku Channel combined accounted for 5.7% of all US TV viewing in May 2025 (Gracenote) — larger than any single broadcast network.
• FAST hours watched: 1.8 billion in August 2025, +43% YoY (Comscore).

Sports FAST inventory specifically more than doubled YoY in 2025, to 220+ sports FAST channels (Gracenote count). The category of “ad-supported streaming sports” did not meaningfully exist in 2020. It is now an inventory pool of national scale.

10.3 The buy is structurally more efficient than RSN cable

Several attributes make a FAST sports inventory pool structurally more efficient for advertisers than RSN-era linear cable:

• Addressability. Per the Gracenote 2025 Contextual Advertising Report, 84% of CTV advertising is now handled programmatically, against single-digit programmatic share for linear cable sports. That gap means a brand buying CTV sports can target by household, behavior, geography, and contextual signal at impression level — none of which a linear RSN buy supported.
• Lean-in, opt-in audiences. A fan opens Victory+ (or Tubi, or Roku, or KFAA on a connected TV) to watch a specific game. They are not background-noise viewers paid for by a non-fan-paying-anyway cable subscriber. The CPM is paid against a higher-attention impression and a known fan identity.
• CPMs are competitive with linear sports. Per adwave’s 2025 platform CPM benchmark synthesis, linear cable runs ~$20-25 CPM, broadcast linear ~$40-50, broad CTV $20-35, FAST channels $15-20, and premium ad-tier CTV (Netflix-class) $35-45. The implication: a FAST sports buy is bought at a discount to linear broadcast but priced like (or above) cable, with materially better targeting and attribution. Per the same synthesis, normalized CTV CPMs run 2-4x linear TV when controlled for targeting and waste.
• Closed-loop attribution. A first-party data spine on a streaming app — device, household, behavior, in-app commerce — supports attribution at a granularity linear cable cannot. That is the variable that pulls direct-response and performance budgets into sports.
• The category is reallocating, not net-new. Per the IAB 2025 report, most of the dollars flowing into CTV are reallocations — primarily from linear TV (36%) and social video. The structural reading: every dollar a Victory+, a Scripps, or a team-owned DTC platform captures is being subtracted from an RSN’s old revenue pool or from a national broadcast spot pool. The aggregate sports ad pie is roughly fixed; the carriage of that pie is shifting from rights-fee-funded RSN distribution to ad-funded streaming distribution.

10.4 The Victory+ proof points (and what is still proprietary)

Victory+’s public-record advertising proof points to date:

• Self-serve ad manager launch. On October 2, 2025, APMC launched a self-serve ad manager, opening Victory+’s premium CTV sports inventory to direct buys from advertisers and agencies. This is the structural piece: a sports rights stack that supports programmatic, self-serve, and direct sales without an RSN sales force in the middle.
• Brand partnerships. Dallas-based performance-marketing agency PMG was disclosed as a Dallas Stars + Victory+ partner in late 2024, the first publicly-named anchor advertiser.
• Inventory growth from portfolio expansion. The 2025-26 portfolio addition of WNBA (Lynx, Dream), NWSL (Sunday Night Soccer), and Dallas Cowboys content (announced April 16, 2026 via APMC) materially expanded the addressable advertiser base — particularly for brands targeting the female-sports-fan cohort, which has been structurally under-served by linear sports inventory.

Victory+-specific CPMs, advertiser counts, and per-game revenue are not publicly disclosed; this report does not estimate them. The structural argument — that the OTA + FAST model unlocks a materially larger and structurally more efficient ad market than the RSN model it replaces — is supported by the public data above and applies to every operator pursuing the model, not Victory+ alone.

10.5 The risk: measurement maturity

The largest open question is measurement maturity. Per Gracenote’s follow-up 2026 CTV report, “advertisers see the potential of CTV, but they’re hesitant to reallocate budget from linear TV because of a lack of information.” A material share of brand-budget CTV spend still goes through CTV-as-extension-of-linear buying, not CTV-as-native. The platforms that build the cleanest sports identity graph, the most rigorous outcomes measurement, and the most agency-friendly self-serve tooling are the ones that will capture disproportionate share of the budget reallocation that is already underway.

For franchises evaluating their 2026-27 local-rights structure, the implication is sharper than the headline rights-fee number suggests. A traditional RSN’s value proposition is a guaranteed cash line. A FAST + OTA hybrid’s value proposition is participation in an ad market that is growing 14% per year while the cable bundle declines 7% per year. Over a five-year contract horizon, the latter compounds in a way the former does not.

11. What’s Next: 2026-27 and Beyond

Three things to watch over the next 12 months.

11.1 The NBA centralized hub decision

Expected to be finalized in summer 2026 for a fall 2026-27 launch. The winning bidder (or bidder combination) will set the precedent for how American sports leagues approach centralized local distribution in the streaming era. Per SBJ’s May 1, 2026 reporting, the deal “could eventually become a billion-dollar bidding war between multiple digital outlets.”

Key questions:

• Does the deal allow team-by-team opt-outs (preserving team-owned RSN economics where they exist)?
• Does it bundle with national rights (favoring ESPN or Amazon, who hold them) or stand alone (favoring YouTube TV, Google, Apple)?
• What is the rights-fee split between league and teams?
• Does the deal include the Knicks (MSG Network) and Lakers (Spectrum SportsNet), or do those teams remain on their existing structures?

11.2 The 11 unannounced NBA + 5 unannounced NHL teams

By tipoff of 2026-27 (October 2026), 11 NBA teams and 5 NHL teams currently on FanDuel will need to have announced 2026-27 distribution arrangements. The pattern is likely to combine: (a) bridge deals for the gap (per DAZN’s reported one-year interim offers), (b) team-by-team Scripps/Gray/TEGNA OTA deals (per Pistons, Predators), and (c) free streaming partnerships (Victory+, possibly others). The composition of this final layer will determine the equilibrium of the post-RSN local-rights market.

11.3 The WNBA local-rights aisle expansion

After Victory+’s deals with the Lynx (April 22, 2026) and Dream (May 7, 2026), the WNBA has a two-team marker on the post-RSN model and a publicly-stated framework for the rest of the league. If even two or three more WNBA teams adopt similar free-streaming-first local rights over the 2026 season, the WNBA will have done in two years what the NHL has not done in twenty: built a coherent local-rights stack outside the cable bundle, with first-party data flowing to the team and the league.

The WNBA’s situation is particularly instructive because the cable bundle was never the dominant distribution for most WNBA franchises — many teams had courtesy local cable arrangements or none at all. The post-RSN model is therefore not a replacement; it is a first-time greenfield. This is the cleanest test case in the market for whether free-streaming-first local rights can build sustainable franchise economics.

12. Implications

For franchise owners considering 2026-27 distribution arrangements, the analytic frame is no longer “what is the next RSN deal worth?” but rather “what is the right hybrid stack?” The four-model taxonomy above (league-direct, free OTA, team-owned with DTC, free streaming) is not exhaustive, and most franchises will end up combining elements of three.

The single largest variable in that stack decision is what monetization function the franchise asks its local distribution to perform. If the local rights need to produce cash, team-owned RSN with paid DTC is the highest-ceiling option (but only viable in top markets). If the local rights need to produce audience and data, free OTA + free streaming is the highest-ceiling option. If the local rights need to produce both — at lower amounts each — a hybrid OTA + paid DTC pairing splits the difference.

The leagues’ postures effectively constrain the choice set:

• MLB clubs that have not already done so are increasingly defaulting into MLB Local Media (a pool with predictable but modest per-team economics).
• NBA clubs are waiting to see whether the centralized hub bid produces enough revenue to make it the dominant default. If the bid is robust, expect 20+ teams in the hub; if it’s weak, expect more team-by-team OTA + DTC deals.
• NHL clubs have effectively been told to figure it out themselves; expect a diverse mix dominated by Scripps (free OTA) and Victory+ (free streaming) in the next 12 months.
• WNBA clubs have the cleanest greenfield; expect rapid Victory+-style deal proliferation.

The repricing event most worth watching is the 2027 franchise valuation marks. If, despite the local-rights collapse, NBA and NHL franchise values continue to rise materially — which seems likely — the structural interpretation is that the local-rights line was never the variable pricing the asset. If valuations stall, the structural interpretation is that the local-rights collapse is finally being priced in. Either outcome will resolve the question that has hung over American sports media since 2018: how much of the franchise valuation premium was real, and how much was the cable bundle’s gift to a pricing model that no longer exists.

Sources

Sources are linked inline throughout the report. Primary sources:

• Wikipedia — Main Street Sports Group
• Wikipedia — Major League Baseball on regional sports networks
• Wikipedia — Victory+
• Wikipedia — Rangers Sports Network
• Wikipedia — AT&T SportsNet
• Wikipedia — Root Sports Northwest
• Wikipedia — Scripps Sports
• Sports Business Journal — Tom Friend liquidation reporting (Jan 30, 2026) (paywall)
• Sports Business Journal — Pistons-Scripps deal (May 13, 2026) (paywall)
• Sports Business Journal — DAZN NBA hub pursuit (May 1, 2026) (paywall)
• Sports Media Watch — Jan 2026 collapse summary
• Sports Media Watch — MLB local broadcasts FAQ (March 2026)
• Sports Media Watch — NBA local rights package (Feb 2026)
• Sports Media Watch — Angels buyout (March 2026)
• Sportico — Main Street RSNs dead end
• Sportico — Scripps Florida hockey
• ESPN — Main Street wind-down announcement
• Front Office Sports — MLB clubs drop Main Street
• TVREV — End of the RSN era
• The Desk — NBA streaming hub
• The Desk — Main Street wind-down
• The Desk — Scripps + Predators
• Awful Announcing — RSN liquidation
• Awful Announcing — 9 MLB teams split
• Dallas Hoops Journal — Mavericks playbook
• D Magazine — Rangers, Stars, Mavs, Wings adjustment
• Forbes — Scripps Florida hockey
• The Hockey News — FanDuel parent folding
• TV News Check — Pistons OTA
• TV News Check — Predators-Scripps
• Press release — Predators-Scripps (April 7, 2026)
• Press release — Pistons-Scripps (May 13, 2026)
• Press release — Atlanta Dream-Victory+ (May 7, 2026)
• Press release — Lynx-Victory+ (April 22, 2026)
• MLB.com — 2026 local broadcasts guide
• Utah Mammoth 2025-26 broadcast schedule

Victory+ audience and Dallas Stars business outcomes

• Business Wire — Victory+ outpaces NHL viewership averages (May 18, 2026)
• Business Wire — 342,000+ concurrent viewers, Stars-Avalanche (March 12, 2026)
• APMC press hub
• Sportico — Knicks, Ducks among local ratings gainers (April 24, 2026)
• Sports Video Group — March to Victory+ (October 14, 2024)
• D Magazine — Conversation with Brad Alberts (July 12, 2024)
• CNBC — NHL valuations 2025: Dallas Stars
• SBJ — Stars to raise season-ticket prices (February 5, 2025)
• Sportico — NHL teams’ record $1.5B sponsorship revenue (June 13, 2025)
• Bloomberg — Alberts on PE and rising NHL valuations (April 10, 2026)
• RBR — FOX 4 and More 27 add Stars OTA package
• PMG partners with Dallas Stars and Victory+

OTA penetration and pay-TV structural data

• TVB / Nielsen — National Media-Related Universe Estimates (July 2025) PDF
• Pew Research Center — 83% of US adults use streaming services (July 1, 2025)
• TheDesk — S&P Global pay-TV penetration decline (September 2025)
• TV Tech — Horowitz Research, antenna ownership 19% in 2025

CTV / FAST advertising market

• IAB — 2025 Digital Video Ad Spend & Strategy Report (April 28, 2025) / PR
• MediaPost — IAB 2026 ad spend forecast (January 28, 2026)
• Gracenote — 2025 Contextual Advertising Report / PDF
• Gracenote — 2026 CTV Advertising Report
• eMarketer — FAQ on FAST (April 22, 2026)
• TV Tech — GroupM global CTV forecast
• adwave — TV advertising CPM by platform
• adwave — CTV advertising 2026 forecast
• adwave — FAST channel count
• N.A. Media Experts — CTV advertising benchmarks 2026
• APMC self-serve ad manager launch (October 2, 2025) — Morningstar/Accesswire

End of report.